

The Communists, Henry Wallace, and the Progressive Party of 1948

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Throughout the presidential campaign of 1948, the origins of Henry A. Wallace's Progressive Party occasioned heated debate among political partisans. Even today, among historians, it remains controversial. In 1948 and afterwards, Progressive Party critics contended that the communists, on orders from Moscow, had conceived the idea immediately after the war, organized the party according to a "detailed time-table," chose Wallace as the candidate, and pressured him relentlessly until he accepted his predetermined role. In their view, the Wallace candidacy was an entirely synthetic, top-down venture that the communists had created for the sole purpose of serving the interests of Soviet foreign policy. Accordingly, they portrayed noncommunist Progressives—including Wallace himself—as a motley collection of innocent dupes consciously or unconsciously doing the Kremlin's bidding by dividing and discrediting American liberalism and paving the way for the victory of "reaction."¹

Not surprisingly, Wallace supporters told a different story. In *Gideon's Army*, a three-volume chronicle of the Progressive Party, journalism professor Curtis MacDougall dismissed such an account of the party's origins as a fantastic conspiracy theory. According to MacDougall, the communists decided to support the third party only after Wallace had committed to run for president and after independent liberals—like MacDougall himself—had laid the groundwork for his candidacy. The new party, he maintained, was the inevitable outgrowth of liberals' profound disillusionment with the Truman administration and the only vehicle available for "progressives" to combat the rightward drift of the nation's politics. The communists might have jumped on the

Wallace bandwagon for their own reasons later on, but had little to do with launching the party.²

A close look at the relationship between the evolution of the postwar CPUSA line and the origins of the Wallace third party offers little support for MacDougall's conclusion. The communists played a vital role in promoting sentiment for a third party, and, through their influence in Popular Front organizations, saw to it that "independent political action" became the preferred remedy to offset the rise of postwar conservatism. Their tireless efforts transformed inchoate dissatisfaction into the organized political force that became the Progressive Party. Yet accounts that portray the CP painstakingly following a complex blueprint to a preordained conclusion are equally distorting. Much as the American communists would have liked to have had one, there is no evidence of a Moscow-directed master strategy. Instead, uncertainty, hesitation, internal tensions, and the pursuit of contradictory objectives characterized this period of their party's history. For all the communists' public bravado about the scientific nature of Marxist-Leninism, their course of action during the immediate postwar years was decidedly *ad hoc*. Local circumstances and the interplay of personalities often proved decisive in determining day-to-day policy while ideological formulations provided after-the-fact rationalizations. Though major shifts in emphasis came in response to promptings from abroad, the Party's leaders had no guarantee that they were correctly interpreting these signals. Indeed, individual CPUSA leaders routinely exploited this uncertainty to advance their own ideological agenda, claiming that it had Moscow's sanction. Finally, critics' charges that the communists' backing of a third party constituted a plot to facilitate the triumph of reaction do not stand up to scrutiny. Though the American communists undoubtedly supported Wallace's candidacy because they believed it served the interests of Soviet foreign policy, Party literature demonstrates that they genuinely feared "Republican reaction" as much as the anticommunist liberals who condemned the new party. This concern over splitting the "progressive forces" weighed so heavily on CP leaders that as late as September 1947, they appeared to have abandoned the third party project. In short, the communists' role in the origins of the Progressive Party was both more extensive than MacDougall acknowledged and more complex than the party's critics have allowed.

The American communists' interest in a third party arose in direct response to the April 1945 publication of the so-called "Du-

clos Letter" in *Les Cahiers du communisme*, the theoretical journal of the French Communist Party. Though the missive appeared under the signature of Jacques Duclos, a senior PCF functionary, American communist leaders correctly interpreted it as the latest word from Moscow.³ As we now know, the document was composed in the Kremlin and published in Russian in the January 1945 issue of the *Bulletin of the Bureau of Information of the All-Union Communist Party*, an internal publication distributed only to top CPSU and Soviet government officials. In essence, the letter signaled another "left turn" in the international communist line and indicated that even before hostilities ceased, the Soviets were preparing to confront their wartime allies. Specifically, the letter criticized the American communist leader, Earl Browder, for presuming that peaceful coexistence between communists and capitalists—on both a national and international level—would continue indefinitely. Soviet-American diplomatic agreements by no means signaled "the possibility of the suppression of the class struggle in the postwar period," the article warned. Browder had seriously erred in dissolving the CPUSA for he had deprived the working class of its only vehicle for "independent political action." By conceiving of the American CP as but one participant in a broad "progressive coalition" working for realizable reform within the two party system, he had engaged in a "notorious revision of Marxism." In communist parlance, Browder's "liquidationism" presupposed an unacceptable degree of "class collaboration" and forfeited the Party's "leading role" in the struggle against "imperialist reaction."⁴

In practical terms, the Duclos letter ended the CPUSA's accommodating Popular Front strategy—thereafter reviled as "Browderism"—and precipitated the "great leader's" expulsion after a bizarre orgy of vilification and breast-beating self-criticism on the part of his formerly devout disciples. William Z. Foster, Browder's long-time rival, then reconstituted the party, setting down a more classically Leninist line that stressed the irreconcilable differences between the "imperialist" and "socialist" camps, and that favored ideological purity over political pragmatism. "Militant mass action" and "greatly sharpened attacks on monopoly capital" became the order of the day. Though cooperation with certain "progressive" forces remained permissible, the aggressive promotion of the programs of international communism took priority.⁵

The post-Duclos line immediately put strains on the Popular Front coalition that had thrived during the war. Though the CP

did not seek to cut ties with sympathetic liberals, the preconditions for a continued alliance became far more stringent. Those unwilling to offer unquestioning support of communist policies—and, more precisely, Soviet foreign policy—were no longer considered suitable associates. Within Popular Front organizations, the communists expected their liberal colleagues to accept resolutions predetermined at CP “fraction” meetings without asking embarrassing questions or raising the issue of democratic procedure. Concealed communists aggressively enforced the party line while denouncing as “red-baiters” those who criticized their tactics or called attention to their presence. The communists also cultivated a political atmosphere in which any opinions not in accordance with the party position became suspect and those who expressed them traitors to the progressive cause. When intellectual intimidation failed to silence heretical liberals, they found themselves publicly branded “reactionaries,” “fascists,” and “warmongers.” Though many noncommunists intent on preserving progressive unity opted for self-censorship, such intransigence on the part of the CP drove away many of the party’s most valued liberal supporters. Yet rather than run the risk of reverting to “Browderite revisionism,” the CPers bid their erstwhile allies good riddance, convinced they were strengthening the progressive forces by cutting their numbers.

Contrary to the later claims of Henry Wallace’s political enemies, however, the CP did not immediately commit itself to launching a third party in the aftermath of the Duclos letter. Indeed, the leadership often appeared unsure exactly how to implement the new line. Tensions soon arose between Foster, a militant hard-liner who seemed willing to sacrifice political success for ideological purity, and the CP’s new general secretary, Eugene Dennis, a less dogmatic figure who shared Foster’s deep commitment to Marxist-Leninism, but feared that “the old man’s” proclivity for “going it alone” would isolate the Party and undermine its effectiveness. Still, both men agreed that an independent third party, no matter how desirable, was a long-term goal that the CP should not force on the “masses” prematurely. But two other manifestations of the abrupt change in the communists’ political perspective did appear early on. First, the CP and those labor unions and Popular Front organizations in which it exercised significant influence grew stridently critical of the Truman administration’s foreign policy; and, second, the party began trumpeting the need for an “anti-monopoly coalition” to halt the march of “reactionary American imperialism.” Both

tacks would contribute significantly to the disintegration of the Popular Front liberalism in the postwar period.⁶

The war had barely ended before the American communists unleashed a torrent of invective at the Truman administration. Party publications that had hailed the President as "a tireless worker for progress" in April, were discovering "imperialist tendencies" in Truman as early as July 1945. By September, CP chairman Foster was bitterly assailing him as a "militant imperialist," while the *Daily Worker* intoned that "the center of the reactionary forces in the world today rests in the United States." Even the Soviet press had not yet resorted to such harsh denunciations. Indeed, most scholars agree that the CPUSA overreacted to the Duclos letter, due in large part to Foster's reading of it as Moscow's endorsement of his own extreme positions on American imperialism and the "war danger." Throughout the 1945-47 period, Foster's views were well to left of most Western European CP leaders, resembling more the Yugoslavian CP under Tito.⁷

Organizations in which the communists exercised significant or controlling influence likewise adopted a more critical stance toward the new president, issuing a flurry of sharply worded resolutions denouncing administration policies. After V-J Day, the National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC), the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts Sciences and Professions (ICCASP), and communist-led unions within the CIO also shifted their primary focus from issues such as full employment and public housing to foreign policy, particularly U.S.-Soviet relations. (In contrast, liberals who would later renounce Popular Front-style politics continued to concentrate on domestic problems.) Significantly, all of this occurred well before the president had firmly committed to a so-called "get tough" policy toward the Soviets.⁸

As the superpowers sparred over Trieste, the Turkish straits, Eastern Europe, and Iran, the rhetoric emanating from NCPAC, ICCASP, and other Popular Front-oriented groups grew increasingly pro-Soviet. In their public statements, they placed sole blame for the deterioration of relations on the United States and scrupulously avoided any criticism of the USSR, smearing as "fascist sympathizers" those who did raise objections. In like manner, they cited each infraction of civil liberties in the U.S. as proof that the nation was spiraling toward fascism while ignoring (or denying) the human rights violations occurring on a massive scale in Soviet-occupied Europe. When Truman resisted Soviet diplomatic pressure, he was accused of resorting to "Hitlerite

tactics," betraying the policies of Franklin Roosevelt, and pursuing a course indistinguishable from that of the "Republican reactionaries." Ghost-written speeches prepared for big "names" to deliver at Popular Front political rallies adopted this same line. Speakers who attempted to alter the content to comport more closely to their own views faced bitter personal attacks and, in one extreme case involving the actress Olivia DeHavilland and the screenwriter Dalton Trumbo, the threat of legal action.⁹

To be sure, organizations like NCPAC and ICCASP were hardly alone in criticizing Truman's foreign policy. Most liberals grumbled about the President's awkward handling of international affairs and deplored his part in contributing to the breakdown of "Big Three unity." Nor was anywhere near a majority of the members of these organizations communist or even pro-communist. Yet the concealed party members, who held key positions in the national offices and staffed many of the local chapters, set the tone. Their single-minded preoccupation with maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union and insistence that accommodating Stalin was the litmus test of a progressive foreign policy distanced their organizations from mainstream liberalism, and indicated the CP's willingness to jettison the wartime Popular Front.¹⁰

In its stead, the party urged "independent political action" in the form of an "anti-monopoly coalition." Its theoreticians, particularly Foster, had convinced themselves that the "imperialist drive of American monopoly capitalism to dominate the world" was paving the way for "a new blood bath of fascism and war." Furthermore, the communists claimed, these same "monopolists" had seized control of the U.S. government. Terrified by the prospect of the "inevitable" postwar economic collapse, these tycoons were pursuing domestic policies destined to bring the nation to the brink of fascism. It was therefore imperative to assemble an anti-monopoly coalition to spearhead the political struggle against these sinister forces—"to pull the teeth of American reaction," as Foster delicately phrased it. This alliance, led, of course, by the workers, would also include "poorer farmers, the Negro people, the progressive professionals and middle classes [and] the bulk of the veterans." Realizing that the incorporation of non-working class elements smacked of "Browderism," Foster insisted that this "Leninist class strategy" was fundamentally different from the heretical "class collaboration" that Browder had espoused. The anti-monopoly coalition would remain independent and never subordinate itself to the interests of the "big bourgeois-

sie" who dominated the "capitalist-controlled" Republican and Democratic Parties. The creation of this coalition was also a matter of some urgency, since the "democratic forces" were "in a race with time." Adopting a five minutes to midnight tone, communist speeches and literature emphasized that war, economic catastrophe, and "American fascism" were not only probable, but imminent, thus necessitating an immediate, broad-based struggle to alleviate the effects of the coming crisis.¹¹

Throughout 1946 and early 1947, the CP's flirtation with independent political action continued. A February 1946 special congressional election in New York City gave the party a chance to gauge the potential strength of the "anti-monopoly" forces. George Charney, the communists' county organizer in Manhattan, observed that the predominantly working class nineteenth district was "well suited to test the burning issues of the day; and to register what new alignments may be in the making in the political arena." The communists therefore pressed the American Labor Party to run a candidate against the Democratic nominee, Arthur G. Klein, a well respected New Deal liberal who had served in Congress during the 1930s. The ALP, which played a balance of power role in New York politics, would normally have endorsed a proven liberal like Klein. But, reflecting the increasing CP influence within its ranks, it submitted to the wishes of the party and nominated Johannes Steel, a popular radio commentator whose close ties to the communists were widely known. (Cables decrypted by the National Security Agency's Venona project would later reveal that Steel had served as a "talent scout" in recruiting American agents for the NKVD.) The communists then withdrew their own candidate, lined up their liberal and labor allies behind Steel, and secured him the endorsements of the New York CIO Council, the NCPAC, and ICCASP. Though Steel lost the election, he ran an impressive race and buoyed communist hopes for mobilizing progressives by working outside the confines of the two party system. "We were elated by the outcome of the by-election," Charney recalled years later. "[W]e believed the Foster line to be fully vindicated, and were persuaded that it was proof of a radical upsurge among the people. To some degree this election contributed to the subsequent formation of the Progressive party."¹²

Despite such encouraging signs, the communists hesitated to force the third party issue lest they alienate labor and other groups deemed indispensable to the success of the anti-monopoly coalition.¹³ "By and large," Eugene Dennis acknowledged in mid-

1946, "the conditions have not yet matured at this time for crystallizing third parties organizationally on a state or local scale. . . . The decisions and blessing of the Left-wing are not the only prerequisites for the successful running of independent candidates and tickets on a representative and effective basis." Though building the CP's "independent political strength" remained a central feature of the post-Duclos line, Dennis cautioned, "in doing this, we must reject the sectarian concept and practice that the maintenance of our independent position means, or must result in our self-isolation, the separation of us Communists from our progressive non-Communist allies, especially in the labor movement. . . . In no case should the struggle for a third, a people's party be developed so as to weaken the cooperation of *all progressives*." He even endorsed "temporary and limited alliances . . . with all peace-loving elements, no matter how unstable and vacillating they may be," including those "numerous groups and individuals who still support the Administration." Continuing in this vein, Dennis scolded "Left-wing forces" within the CIO for jeopardizing labor unity by provoking needless "head-on collisions" with CIO president Philip Murray, the leader of what the Communists liked to call the "Center forces." Praising Murray and the progressive policies of the CIO, he insisted that relations between the Center and the Left "are not temporary, are not based on transitory considerations, but are based on a long-range perspective of friendly collaboration for progressive aims." For the anti-monopoly coalition to succeed, the Center-Left alliance must be maintained, even if Murray and others continued to acquiesce in being the progressive "tail" to the Democratic party dog.¹⁴

By the end of 1946, the party had begun to articulate a strategy for overcoming the Center forces' "tailist tendencies and inclinations." At a December 5 meeting of the national committee, Dennis told his comrades that laying the foundations for a movement from which a third party might evolve required that the CP take a leading role in assembling "some form of independent, political, legislative membership organization . . . in every ward and township." He urged communists to "build [the CIO] PAC, NCPAC, ICC[ASP], and similar committees and movements . . . [and] to organize a grass-roots political machinery." Working within these groups, party members were "to initiate and organize a serious and broad popular discussion . . . on the need of forming a new people's, progressive alignment and party." Still, Dennis added, this "gigantic and consistent effort to

advance and organize in time, on a broad and representative basis, a new people's and progressive party," was to be "closely coordinated" with finding a way to help influence, organize, and assist the struggle . . . to effect a new progressive re-grouping within the Democratic party." In simpler language, this meant that the communists were to establish or join already existing chapters of such liberal pressure groups as NCPAC and ICCASP (soon to merge into the Progressive Citizens of America) and "talk up" the idea of a third party. Simultaneously, they were to help revitalize the left-wing of the Democratic party without losing their independent political identity. This complicated "two track" policy deliberately left open the question of a third presidential ticket in the 1948 election. As Dennis himself readily conceded, such a strategy was "fraught with many difficulties." How could the party maintain an independent, militant position while spearheading the drive for an antimonopoly third party whose success relied on stable alliances with non-communist forces? How could Communists strengthen the left wing of the Democratic party while building a third party movement that would presumably draw left-wingers away from the Democrats?¹⁵

As they had always done, party leaders looked to Moscow to clarify the issue. While ostensible covering the March 1947 foreign ministers' conference in the Soviet capital, *Daily Worker* editor Morris Childs met with B. Vronsky, a section chief of the CPSU Foreign Policy Department. Childs asked Vronsky for the CPSU's opinion on the creation of a third party and the role the progressive movement in the United States should play in the upcoming presidential campaign. Vronsky forwarded Childs's questions to Alexander Paniushkin, the deputy director of the Foreign Policy Department, who offered some tentative answers. "It seems to us," Paniushkin replied, "that in the U.S. the conditions are not yet in place to create such a party at the present time. One of the main obstacles to this step is that unity of action is lacking in the workers' movement. . . . The CPUSA has little influence in American society to resolve this problem on its own, without making use of these forces. It is perfectly obvious that if such a party were created, it would not receive broad support among workers' and progressive organizations and would not be successful in its struggle against the powerful political parties."¹⁶ According to Philip Jaffe, a left-wing editor who at the time was in close touch with the CPUSA leadership, Childs also met with Solomon Lozovsky, a member of the Central Committee of the

Soviet CP. Lozovsky echoed Paniushkin's concern that a third party ticket without strong labor support was bound to fail. He, too, emphasized that the CPUSA's primary task was to achieve unity of action within the American labor movement. In an apparent rebuke to Foster and his more militant acolytes, Lozovsky also remarked that in determining the proper trade union tactics, "it is not the job of a labor leader to cooperate with more radical political leaders, but it is the job of the radical political leaders to cooperate with the labor leaders"—advice, particularly with regard to the Progressive Party and the CIO, that the Communists would have done well to heed.¹⁷

The tone of the political discussions at the CP's June 1947 National Committee meeting reflected the cautionary advice Childs had brought back from Moscow. John Gates, who coordinated the communists' legislative work, delivered a report on the third party issue that reiterated in more precise terms the "two track" strategy that Dennis had laid down earlier. (Bella Dodd, a National Committee member soon to be expelled from the party, later wrote that Gates' submission was "obviously" not his own work, but "the combined efforts of Eugene Dennis and those Party members with whom he was in close touch through the American Labor Party, the Independent Committee of Artists, Scientists, and Professionals, and the communist forces at Capitol Hill, especially the brilliant Albert Blumberg, . . . a regular courier between Dennis and the communist staff in Washington.") In his report, Gates affirmed that "the movement to build a third party must continue and be accelerated." However, he acknowledged its "present narrowness" and emphasized that "much broader forces than are now committed to a new party will have to join the movement to make it possible for it to come into existence in 1948." A ticket backed only by the communists and "other Left forces," he observed, "will obviously not be a major third party." Accordingly, Gates declared, "there can be no third party without a significant breakaway from the Democratic Party, and the winning of the support beyond the communist-led "Left wing" of the CIO. "Such unions as the United Auto Workers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers must favor it," Gates concluded. As for the immediate future, the "key to defeating the GOP and reaction" was to direct "greater and greater pressure on the Democratic party" to pursue a progressive course—to hold the threat of a third party over the heads of Democratic politicians as a "sword of Damocles," a clear indication that even at this late date, the communists continued to draw distinctions between the two ma-

for parties. For the moment, preventing a Republican victory remained the party's primary objective, since, as Foster warned at the same meeting, a GOP triumph would dramatically increase the danger of war.¹⁸

In a subsequent address, Dennis built on Gates' analysis. "It is possible, actually possible, for the third-party movement to facilitate the election of a progressive presidential ticket in 1948 . . .," he maintained, "if this movement is so organized and broadened as to bring about a situation in which there can be a coalition candidate, backed by the independent and third-party forces, *running as a Democrat*. To put it realistically, . . . this is the *only way for the third-party and pro-Roosevelt forces to ensure the defeat of the GOP candidate in 1948*" [italics in the original]. For this to happen, however, the communists had to avoid "adventurous, desperate, and sectarian actions." Particularly within the labor movement, there could be no "go-it-alone policy"—relations with the "Murray forces" had to be preserved. Dennis held fast to this position in the following months. On September 18, 1947, he declared, "We Communists are not adventurers and irresponsible sectarians. We are not going to isolate ourselves. We never did and do not now favor the launching of premature and unrepresentative third parties or independent tickets."¹⁹

The party's "labor influentials" attempted to implement the Gates-Dennis line throughout the summer and early fall of 1947, but the complex—even contradictory—nature of the two track policy encouraged varying interpretations and emphases. As a result, local figures sought to shape the course of the third party movement to suit their own particular needs. In New York, where the American Labor Party provided progressives an already existing avenue for independent political action, the communists soft-pedaled agitation for a new party. Primarily, they feared jeopardizing their alliance with the powerful Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, which accounted for a significant bloc of ALP votes and publicly opposed a third presidential ticket. At the ALP's county committee meetings in mid-August, the communists and their allies agreed to defer the question of a third party, emphasizing instead the need to recruit pro-Wallace candidates to run in the Democratic primaries. Similarly, at a conference shortly before the annual meeting of the New York State CIO, three prominent communist union leaders assured Louis Hollander, the CIO state chairman, that the "left wing" would not propose any resolutions for a third party, a move that would have precipitated a split with the "Center forces." At the

Labor Day weekend convention in Saratoga Springs, they proved true to their word. Indeed, the party forces were so eager to appear accommodating that they even voted for a resolution criticizing the Soviet Union's frequent use of the veto in the United Nations.²⁰

The communist press immediately praised the party's "correct strategy" in order to preempt any charges of backsliding from more militant rank and file members. Had the CP pressed the third party issue at either meeting, Simon Gerson wrote in *Political Affairs*, it "would have been a situation made to order for the Right Wing and all other opponents of independent political action by labor." The *Daily Worker* added that efforts to "identify the third-party movement in New York and elsewhere solely with the prospects of a third presidential ticket in 1948" were part of a reactionary plot "to divide and disintegrate the natural adherents and supporters of the third party trend." By preserving unity, the communists and their allies had "dash[ed] the hopes" of the reactionaries.²¹

In California, however, some of the CP's "labor influentials" pursued a more aggressive course in agitating for a third party. At the second biennial convention of the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union held in San Francisco May 5-9, 1947, Hugh Bryson, the union's outspoken young president, secured passage of a resolution demanding the formation of "a new political party based on the trade union movement and composed of farmers, white collar workers, professional people, veterans, and minority groups." The statement also condemned the Truman administration for abandoning the unity "with other nations and particularly our wartime allies." Bryson directed MCS members who served as delegates to the CIO Industrial Union Councils to fight for the resolution's adoption at their meetings. Those slated to attend the national CIO convention in October received similar instructions. In the ensuing weeks, Bryson moved quickly to advance the third-party cause, soliciting the backing of various state and national labor leaders and creating a twenty-three person joint trade union committee to set up the party's organizational machinery. His activities received extensive coverage in the *MCS Voice* and the Communist *Daily People's World*.²² Though Bryson insisted he was out to create a California version of the ALP rather than a campaign vehicle for Henry Wallace, the former vice president's triumphal speaking tour of the state in mid-May gave the union leader's movement added publicity as rumors flew in the press of a potential third party presidential candidacy.²³

Such talk concerned many California progressives who, despite their eagerness to unseat Truman, feared that an independent Wallace run would split the liberal vote and insure a Republican victory. Under the leadership of former state Attorney General Robert W. Kenny, they set out to build a Wallace presidential boom *within* the Democratic party. In their view, pitting Wallace against Truman in the state's 1948 presidential primary would best serve the progressive cause, for if their candidate won, the left would be poised to take control of the state Democratic party machinery and exercise significant leverage at the national convention. Moreover, even if Wallace failed to secure the nomination, his strong showing would force the Democrats to "dump" Truman in favor of a more liberal candidate. Kenny himself was rumored to favor Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, but refrained from saying so publicly.²⁴

Shortly after Wallace's May appearance in Los Angeles, a group of liberal Democrats, labor leaders, and pro-communist progressives met with Kenny to discuss the implementation of such strategy. With the more "left" elements taking the lead, the majority urged him to chair a meeting of "Democrats for Wallace" that would initiate the legal process for placing Wallace's name on the primary ballot. Kenny agreed, and called a conference for July 19 in Fresno. Addressing the over three hundred Democrats in attendance (many of them concealed communists), he maintained that a Wallace draft would not cause a party split, but restore the unity "destroyed by Mr. Truman's abandonment of the policies of Franklin Roosevelt." The president had already "chloroformed" the independent voters vital to the party's electoral success at the state and local levels, Kenny declared. Truman's nomination would thus insure defeat for the Democratic ticket from top to bottom. But, he continued, "with Wallace, backed by the Democratic party and the independent vote he will attract, [we] will get the same kind of majorities that won for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944. . . . In other words, with Truman, we stand to win nothing at all—with Wallace we can win everything." The proper course for progressives was not to launch a third party, Kenny insisted, but to "liberalize" the Democratic party. If the former vice president won the California primary but failed to receive the nomination, Kenny allowed, no one could "restrain the people from going out and voting for Henry Wallace," but unless and until that happened, there should be no discussion of an independent candidacy.²⁵

Kenny's left-wing associates had provided him with a skewed impression of the political landscape, however. Assuming he had the backing of "the people"—and not just the *Daily People's World*—he had called the Fresno meeting without bothering to gauge the temper of "middle-of-the-road" Democrats or assessing the depth of Wallace support among rank and file union members. As it happened, his strategy—which was virtually the same as the Dennis-Gates line, accounting for the significant communist presence at the Democrats for Wallace meeting—held little appeal for his fellow Democrats. Though they acknowledged Wallace's success in turning out enthusiastic crowds, they did not discern the level of broad mass support for the former vice president or his peace program that their more "progressive" colleagues took as a given. In fact, public opinion surveys told quite a different story. Nearly every sampling taken in the state showed Democratic voters backing Truman's foreign policy by nearly four to one. According to a June Gallup poll, Democrats across the country preferred Truman to Wallace as their party's nominee by a 71 to 12 percent margin. When asked their opinion of nine presidential contenders, Democrats gave Truman the highest "favorable" rating and Wallace the highest "unfavorable" rating. Even polls commissioned by Wallace's California backers did not reveal substantial support beyond middle class and professional voters in Los Angeles—the remnants of the fast disintegrating wartime popular front.²⁶

Understandably, party regulars feared that any association with the "Wallace crowd" was a recipe for disaster. One veteran politician warned Helen Gahagan Douglas, who was up for reelection to Congress in 1948, to stay away from the party's left-wingers. "They're on the wrong track," he said. "Our people were radical when they were hungry. Now they have wrinkles in their stomach from good eating. They don't like this Bolshevik stuff. They like the way Truman has told Stalin to go jump in the Pacific Ocean. You'll stub your pretty toe, my dear, if you line up with . . . Wallace." Douglas and many other party regulars would heed this shrewd advice. A week after the Fresno gathering, a special meeting of the Democratic state central committee emphatically rejected Kenny's Wallace-for-President movement. By a lopsided 170-19, the delegates adopted a statement that endorsed the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine and equated communism with fascism. A Kenny-engineered compromise resolution that would have allowed the anti-Truman faction to save face never reached the floor.²⁷

Though the Kenny forces' inauspicious showing might have given California Communists pause about the prospects for "liberalizing" the Democratic party—much less launching a viable left-wing third party—they redoubled their efforts on behalf of "independent political action," even at the risk of estranging their non-Communist progressive allies. On August 3, Bryson's trade union committee announced plans to hold a special caucus after the upcoming meeting of the California Legislative Conference, where "definite action" would be taken on the "actual organization of a third party." Three weeks later, approximately six hundred delegates turned out at the Odd Fellows Temple in Los Angeles and launched the Independent Progressive Party, naming Bryson its temporary chairman. The crowd, which observers found noticeably more "left" than that at Fresno, listened to a series of speakers attack President Truman and the Democratic party in the most inflammatory terms.²⁸

Still, the communists and their allies pledged to continue cooperating with the Kenny forces. The organizers of the newly-christened IPP explained that its formation would not undermine "Democrats for Wallace." Rather, they claimed, the threat of a third party would strengthen Kenny's cause by increasing the pressure from the left on state Democratic leaders. In part to emphasize its willingness to work in tandem with Kenny, the IPP decided to qualify for the ballot by conducting a petition campaign rather than asking Democratic voters to change their affiliation. IPP officials encouraged their supporters to remain in the Democratic party through the primary so they could vote for pro-Wallace convention delegates. In an address before the California Legislative Conference, Bryson also sought to allay fears about the IPP's splitting the liberal vote. "Will the new party run candidates against progressives who are registered in other parties?" he asked rhetorically. "No, emphatically no! The new party will work persistently to make sure there is only one progressive candidate for each office." Even the conservative Los Angeles *Times* concluded that despite all the third party ballyhoo, Bryson's "true object" was "to gain control of the Democratic party."²⁹

Regardless of the IPP's stated intentions, Kenny realized that the third party movement would cripple Democrats for Wallace by drawing into the petition campaign the very rank and file workers whose services he would need to sustain an intra-party insurgency. Moreover, given California's cross-filing rules, under which candidates could run in both the Republican and Demo-

cratic primaries, establishing a cohesive *second* party—let alone a third party—posed a formidable challenge. Fully aware that the communists were the driving force behind the August 24 gathering, Kenny set up a meeting with the CPUSA national chairman William Z. Foster to express his concern. By severing itself from the Democratic Party, he argued, the left would be committing political suicide at the very moment when he believed it stood a chance to lead a progressive resurgence in state politics. Foster, then on a speaking tour of the west coast, found Kenny's arguments against a third party compelling. Reflecting the ambivalence of the party's national leadership, he acknowledged that such an ambitious project, though desirable, might best be postponed until broad mass support could be insured. But Nemmy Sparks, the party's combative Los Angeles county chairman, also in attendance, would hear none of this. The California CP had already thrown itself into the signature campaign and was not about to reverse course, he declared. So heated did the ensuing Kenny-Sparks exchange become that the two men almost came to blows. Though Kenny left the meeting convinced he had successfully argued his case, Foster made no effort to call off the local communists who remained committed to the third party course. "I shook him up," Kenny later recalled, but he "must have gotten unshook afterwards." Indeed, Kenny's hope of papering over the differences between the communists and Popular Front liberals like himself was misplaced. His unpleasant confrontation with Sparks epitomized the disheartening experience of many progressives who had tried to sustain a political coalition with the communists in the wake of the Duclos letter.³⁰

The postwar history of the Hollywood chapter of ICCASP, the state's most prestigious left-liberal organization, aptly illustrates the party's role in undermining progressive comity. As early as December 1945, the first fissures had already begun to appear, as even the most sympathetic liberals grew restless at the CP's obstreperousness. "The Communist hard core began to run things openly and to dictate policy," recalled the screenwriter Milton Sperling, an active HICASP member. "They really became obnoxious. They said, 'No, we're not going to do it that way, we're going to do it my way, our way.' And the Party line became very visible. . . . This offended people. It offended them on a personal level, and it offended them on a political level. They drove out the middle road [members], they drove out the liberals, by hewing to a very straight [party] line and by organizing everything their own way."³¹

Much of this had occurred under the watch of Sparks, a veteran commissar who had taken over leadership of the southern California Communist Party in 1945. By heavy-handedly imposing the post-Duclos line, he systematically decimated Los Angeles' once flourishing Popular Front coalition. Even his CP comrades considered Sparks unnecessarily intolerant and authoritarian. "He was far too accustomed to simply pounding the table and saying, 'This is the decision and this must be done,'" recalled Dorothy Healey, a prominent California communist. To make matters worse, Sparks surrounded himself with similarly autocratic underlings who soon alienated many of the Party's most influential non-communist allies.³² According to Ellenore Hittelman, a concealed party member who served as HICCASP's legislative director, "[Sparks] displayed nearly criminal policies toward other, non-Party organizations. It was the first time I ever saw such direct interference in the affairs of previously allied organizations, so many broken promises, so much rechanneling of funds. His insensitive muscle-flexing gave the Communist Party a bad name in a broader circle than ever before." "The times were bad, no question about that," Hittelman added. "But at the very moment when you should be trying to keep every connection that's possible to keep, [we went] around chopping off those connections."³³

In one of many vexing incidents, Sparks precipitated a schism within the progressive camp during the 1946 primary campaign by demanding that HICCASP and all other organizations under the Party's sway endorse the U.S. senatorial candidacy of former lieutenant governor and current Congressman Ellis Patterson, a long time CP ally. Most HICCASP liberals preferred Will Rogers, Jr., the son of the famous entertainer, who also had the support of many Democratic Party leaders. But, for the sake of internal harmony, they were willing to have the organization remain neutral. The communists, however, viewed the contest as a struggle for control of the liberal movement in southern California and an opportunity to lay the groundwork for a third party. Ignoring pleas not to press the issue, Sparks ordered the communists on the HICCASP Executive Board to force a vote on the Rogers-Patterson question or face "charges" from the party. After a "knock-down, drag-out fight," the pro-CP faction won, thus reinforcing what one HICCASP official called "the general feeling that the left was in control." Employing similar tactics, the communists also secured a Patterson endorsement from the Los Angeles CIO Political Action Committee and the county Democratic

central committee, both of which were under strong CP influence. Throwing its entire weight into the Senatorial primary campaign (to the neglect of Robert Kenny's gubernatorial race) the left transformed the contest into a bitter intraparty feud, and, ultimately, a litmus test of its own political strength. Pillorying the regular Democrats as fascist-minded reactionaries, the left-wingers set out on their own, determined to demonstrate the efficacy of "independent political action." "When we get through," boasted Philip "Slim" Connelly, an officer of the Los Angeles CIO-PAC and a concealed Communist Party member, "there won't be any Democratic party."³⁴

Unlike the Steel-Klein election in New York, however, the results of this third party "trial run" were hardly encouraging. On June 4, Rogers trounced Patterson, who, in an unexpectedly feeble showing, failed to carry a single county and polled only 37 percent of the vote in the Popular Front stronghold of Los Angeles. Despite conducting a well financed, high profile campaign backed by the vaunted Communist Party organization, Patterson drew little support outside of left-wing circles and barely outpolled the Republican candidate, William Knowland, who had cross-filed in the Democratic primary. Post-election analyses noted that the Patterson campaign had neglected state issues, focusing more on ideology, which was of little interest to most voters.³⁵ Furthermore, the sharp divisions that Patterson's candidacy had created likely cost Robert Kenny the Democratic nomination for governor, which he lost to Earl Warren, the popular Republican incumbent who had also cross-filed. (Years later Kenny quipped that he had been beaten not by Warren, but "by a Frenchman named Duclos.") "The California primaries," *Nation* correspondent Carey McWilliams observed, "clearly indicate what will happen nationally if the third-party question is raised without full consideration of the risks involved. . . . The people are not prepared to join a left-directed political movement."³⁶

The Patterson debacle drained away what remained of HICCASP's political prestige and prompted many liberals to reconsider their affiliation with the organization. "While most did not dispute the right of the Communists to push their own agenda," the journalist Ronald Brownstein has written, "they understood that the alliance with Communists restricted their own political expression. With the Party holding effective control over HICCASP, alliance, in fact, virtually neutered the liberals as an independent political force."³⁷ A month later, the organization's executive council failed to pass a mildly worded resolution that

declared that the United States and the Soviet Union "could live together in peace and good will," but rejected communism "as a desirable form of government for the U.S.A." Soon after, disenchanted liberals, including James Roosevelt, son of the late president, streamed out of the organization, leaving the pro-communist faction to preside over the wreckage. Most had resigned with great reluctance and addressed the communist issue gingerly, if at all. Appalled by the rightward trend in postwar politics, Roosevelt and other liberals maintained that they had no intention of "joining in the flood of red-baiting which is hitting the country," yet neither would they obediently toe the party line for the sake of "progressive unity." As the director Philip Dunne later recalled, "We felt we had to deal with our country's problems from within and we certainly were not accepting leadership from any organization outside of the country. It was that simple."³⁸

Despite these defections, the California communists and their allies continued to pursue their strategy of independent political action. According to the *Daily People's World*, the primary results had actually confirmed the need for a third party since the Republicans and Democrats were clearly in the hands of reactionaries. Defiant in defeat, Patterson refused to endorse Rogers, and in September acceded to HICCASP's call to conduct a write-in campaign to retain his sixteenth district congressional seat. The only way to win the people's support, he insisted, was to present them with an uncompromising, progressive program. Running as a true third-party candidate in November, Patterson won only 14 percent of the vote, despite being a popular incumbent in HICCASP's strongest district.³⁹

Such sectarian tactics were precisely what Eugene Dennis and other top communists had abjured. During his December 1946 address to the CPUSA national committee, the party's general secretary pointedly censured his California comrades for their role in the Kenny and Patterson defeats. Later, Dennis also cast a suspicious eye at Bryson's activities on behalf of a third party, which, if taken too far, threatened to rupture the crucial Center-Left alliance within the CIO. Throughout the summer of 1947, *People's Daily World* columnist Adam Lapin, in close touch with the CP's New York leadership, expressed strong doubts about the third party, emphasizing that defeating Robert A. Taft and the Republicans should remain the primary target for progressives. Notably, Longshoreman Union chief Harry Bridges, the Party's (and the CIO's) most influential figure on the west coast, re-

mained noncommittal toward the IPP. Though condemning the "evils of the two-party system," Bridges pledged his support to "the progressive forces in the Democratic Party." At an August meeting of the state CIO, one of his union's division heads opposed the Bryson forces on the third party issue. Indeed, by Labor Day 1947, it appeared that the CP, despite its protracted agitation for an independent third party, was cautiously backing away from the idea, at least for the 1948 elections.⁴⁰

On October 5, 1947, however, "news from the east" changed everything for the American communists. A *Pravda* dispatch revealed that at a secret meeting in the small Polish village of Szklarska Poreba, representatives from nine European CPs had founded a new organization, the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, the Cominform. Andrei Zhdanov, a senior official in the Soviet Politburo, delivered the conference's keynote address, a strident polemic that seemed to represent a sharp veering to the left in the international communist line. Emphasizing the traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine of "two camps," Zhdanov declared that the forces of democracy and imperialism were locked in an irrepressible conflict and called on the various parties to launch an all-out counteroffensive against what he termed the "predatory and expansionist course" of the American imperialist camp. Specifically, he ordered the European communists to "coordinate their efforts" and attack the recently announced "Truman-Marshall Plan" along all lines—"political, economic, and ideological." As the "vanguard of the opposition," they were to "be the leading force in the cause of drawing all anti-fascist, freedom-loving elements into the struggle against the new American expansionist plans for the enslavement of Europe." To accomplish this, the French and Italian communists in particular were to forge "aggressive united fronts from below," by appealing directly to the "toiling masses" over the heads of their vacillating bourgeois leaders. Since concessions to the imperialists would only make them "still more insolent and aggressive," Zhdanov concluded, "the main danger for the working class at this moment lies in the underestimation of its own strength and overestimation of the forces of the imperialist camp." *Pravda* published the full text of Zhdanov's speech on October 22.⁴¹

The establishment of the Cominform impelled the American Communist Party to carry out yet another of its notorious 180-degree turns. Within a month, all the solemn warnings against "sectarian adventures" and "self-isolating 'go it alone' policies" had been quietly abandoned. Convinced it was following Mos-

cow's will, the CPUJSA scrapped its two track strategy and put the immediate launching of a third party at the top of its agenda, thereby jeopardizing political alliances the party had been cultivating for more than a decade. Ironically, there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviets or anyone else directly "ordered" the CP to switch its position so abruptly. As the historian (and former communist functionary) Joseph Starobin has suggested, the American communists "had misread the meaning of the first meeting of the Cominform, taking the formation of that body to mean that the political polarization taking place in Europe had to be duplicated in the United States." Indeed, newly available Soviet documents suggest that despite Zhdanov's intemperate rhetoric, Moscow was acting defensively, fearing (perhaps with some justification) that the Marshall Plan threatened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It would appear that in September 1947, Stalin was more concerned with consolidating control over his own sphere of influence than with forcing the Americans out of Western Europe. Nonetheless, as Starobin notes, "the American Communists lived in a "mental Comintern." Their leaders were "so passionately involved with the idea of authoritative leadership from abroad" that they assumed that every word from the mouth of Stalin or his subordinates had universal significance and demanded an immediate response. "The pull of the Cominform policy," George Charney later concurred, "was irresistible."⁴²

In this instance, however, the party reacted not solely out of blind loyalty to Moscow, but because the confrontational Zhdanov line seemed to sanction the militant inclinations that several CP functionaries and union leaders had long been suppressing. Though they would never say so publicly, not all of the labor "influentials" had approved of Dennis's preoccupation with maintaining close relations with the "center" forces in the CIO. Some shared Foster's frustration with the alliance and longed for a showdown. Convinced that the "coming economic crisis" would undermine the workers' confidence in their "reformist" leaders, they envisioned the emergence of a more "politically advanced" labor federation under communist leadership. In fact, Foster, who had repeatedly warned against the threat of American imperialism and the increasing war danger, welcomed the organization of the Cominform as evidence that the international movement had at last come around to *his* way of thinking. The party's rank and file also responded enthusiastically. Members who had been uneasy with the "class collaboration" of the war

years and impatient with the indecisiveness of the immediate postwar line eagerly embraced the opportunity to reassume a "vanguard role" in what many perceived as the approaching (and final) struggle against imperialism. Amidst this atmosphere of apocalyptic hysteria, John Gates later recalled, few of his comrades paused to consider that if the international situation was as "thoroughly desperate" as the party claimed, communists should have been trying to build broader alliances rather than severing already existing ones.⁴³

The CP's relationship with organized labor and, specifically, the CIO's "center forces" was the first casualty of the new line. As far as labor officialdom was concerned, the communists' decision to abandon the Democrats in order to launch a third party could not have come at a more inopportune moment. For a time, the notion of a national labor party had attracted a broad and ideologically diverse following, but since Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley bill in June, such sentiment had nearly vanished. Despite past differences with the administration, the record of the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress had convinced most labor leaders that their best bet politically was a continued (albeit officially unacknowledged) alliance with the president and the Democratic party. Even if Truman could not do things *for* them, at least he could prevent things from happening *to* them. On July 20, in a most dramatic change of heart, A.F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, warmly praised the President. Only a year before, when Truman had threatened to draft striking railway workers, Whitney had vowed to spend the union's entire treasury (some \$47 million) to defeat him. But the President's opposition to Taft-Hartley, Whitney declared, had "vindicated him in the eyes of labor." A third party, he added, was now "out of the question."⁴⁴

Though less sanguine about Truman, the CIO's top leadership also opposed a third party, convinced it would dilute labor's political clout just when the times demanded absolute unity. Shaken by the GOP sweep in the 1946 elections, Philip Murray in particular feared that another Republican triumph in 1948 could deal a potentially crippling blow to the industrial union movement. Determined to stem the tide, he and his associates had drawn up an ambitious program of political action to help ensure the election of a pro-labor Congress. For it to succeed, however, the CIO's pro- and anti-communist wings would have to put aside their ideological differences and work in unison. Within this scenario, there was no room for any third party adventure.

As always, Murray placed loyalty to the CIO and "sound trade union principles" above the pursuit of any partisan political agenda and made it clear that he expected his subordinates to do the same. At a July meeting of the Executive Board, the CIO president bluntly told his colleagues that he would not tolerate any dual allegiances. "If Communism is an issue in any of your unions, throw it to hell out . . . and throw its advocates out along with it," Murray exclaimed. "When a man accepts paid office in a union . . . to render service to workers, and then delivers service to outside interests, that man is nothing but a damned traitor."⁴⁵

Escalating cold war tensions and the President's shrewd decision to include labor in the formulation and administration of foreign policy also drew Murray closer to Truman. He welcomed Secretary of State George C. Marshall's June 5 proposal for a European Recovery Program, believing it to be in accord with labor's long term objectives of increased free trade and U.S. exports. Moreover, Murray had begun to find the CIO communists' reflexive pro-Sovietism obtuse and disruptive. The disastrous 1946 election had convinced him that their obeisance to Moscow was earning the CIO an unwarranted "red" reputation that could prove even more costly in 1948. In June 1947, he forced the resignation of Len DeCaux, the CIO's director of publicity and editor of the *CIO News*. DeCaux, an admitted communist, had used the paper as a forum for endorsing Soviet foreign policy, and hostile CIO anti-communists charged that his unpopular political stands were undermining their organizing efforts. Though many assumed his departure signaled Murray's readiness to move against the pro-Soviet faction, the CIO president still held out hope for preserving unity. According to one of his confidants, Murray was willing to tolerate DeCaux's communism, but fired him because his politics was interfering with CIO business. Even after the pro-Soviet faction stepped up its attacks on the Marshall Plan as a "war mongering Wall Street imperialist plot," the CIO president ignored the pleas of his anti-communist colleagues that he discredit such charges by explicitly endorsing the Secretary of State's proposal. Always with one eye on the critical upcoming election, he remained determined to avoid a schism.⁴⁶

On the eve of the CIO's October 1947 national convention in Boston, Murray called together the organization's nine vice presidents to hammer out a compromise resolution on foreign policy that would satisfy all factions and prevent the outbreak of a bitter floor fight. The resulting statement was so vaguely worded that each side could interpret it as an affirmation of its position. As

the journalist Murray Kempton later observed, it "managed at once to endorse the Marshall Plan and not mention it by name." The pro-Soviet faction initially considered the compromise a victory, for it had achieved its primary goal of preventing an official CIO endorsement of the Marshall Plan. Some even entertained the illusion that once the convention opened, the rank and file delegates would compel the leadership into opposing the plan outright. Murray caught them off guard, however, when he took the unprecedented step of inviting Marshall himself to address the convention.⁴⁷

The secretary of state's appearance on October 15 turned the tide against the pro-Soviet faction. In an obvious slap at the Communist Party line which had been denouncing Marshall as a "warmonger," Murray introduced him as "one of the world's greatest champions of peace." The delegates greeted him with thunderous applause and cheered loudly as he warned them against accepting as "gospel truth" the "welter of ideological generalities and slogans" spread by the "enemies of democracy." "Often," Marshall declared, "they are intended to obscure the basic issue, which as I see it today, is simply whether or not men are to be left free to organize their social, political, and economic existence in accordance with their desires; or whether they are to have their lives arranged and dictated for them by small groups of men who have arrogated to themselves this arbitrary power." Dejected communists on the floor of the auditorium quickly abandoned any hope of stampeding the audience into shouting Marshall down and sat in stony silence. The Secretary left the stage to a standing ovation, his tremendous reception leaving little doubt where the majority of the CIO membership stood on the European Recovery Program.⁴⁸

Marshall's address set the tone for the entire convention. Speakers who criticized the communists and their tactics received enthusiastic approval while the addresses of pro-Soviet delegates drew laughter and scattered boos. One CIO staffer recalled that immediately after the Secretary's speech, Murray signaled the anticommunists that they had "permission [to] launch a slash attack on the Left." They wasted little time. Leather-lunged George Baldanzi of the Textile Workers scored those who had denounced President Truman as "another Hitler." "He could not be another Hitler," Baldanzi hollered to the delight of the delegates, "because if he were a Hitler, Russia would work out a pact with him like they did with Hitler." He also dispensed with the rhetorical niceties of the compromise foreign policy statement. "I

want America to know that we subscribe to these fundamental ideas that were enunciated by our Secretary of State," he declared, "no matter how in hell we write up those things in this resolution."⁴⁹

United Auto Workers president Walter Reuther gave the delegates a brief history lesson. Taking them "back to the Chelsea Hotel in Atlantic City in 1940 . . . [where] one other convention of the CIO discussed foreign policy," Reuther recalled the days of the Nazi-Soviet pact when "those who stood alone against Hitlerism and Fascism were called war mongers." "What was said in that convention?" he asked. "Go back and read it some day and you will find . . . the very people in the CIO convention who were calling Roosevelt a war monger are now calling Truman a war monger. . . . The Communists were wrong in 1940 when they called Roosevelt a war monger. History proved them to be wrong. Let us hope and let us pray that we don't have to go through another war to prove we are right this time and those same people are wrong. . . . I say let us not be deluded. We do not want war. Our government does not want war. Nobody in the world wants war."⁵⁰

Uncharacteristically, even Murray entered the fray. As one pro-Soviet delegate declared "when we say we have the right to criticize our foreign policy let us really mean it," the CIO president interjected, "I assume you also believe the heroes of Stalingrad are entitled to take the rostrum and the public platform to expound their views?" Sidestepping the question of whether Soviet citizens enjoyed the right to criticize their government, the delegate responded curtly, "I believe in the American principles of free speech everywhere for everybody." Few heard him over the applause that Murray's barb had provoked. In the midst of a long-winded speech on the Taft-Hartley resolution delivered by James Matles of the pro-Soviet United Electrical Workers, Murray again interrupted, asking him cagily, "Jimmy, are you for or against the resolution?" An embarrassed Matles muttered his reply as the delegates roared with laughter.⁵¹

Later in the proceedings, however, the CIO president tried to reason with the pro-Soviet delegates, hoping—perhaps naively—that he might persuade them to abandon what he considered their harsh rhetoric and misguided views. "I get tired of the things I read in the news prints and the things I hear in public places about war mongering in America," he said. "I have not been able to find it, and I am speaking entirely truthfully when I make that statement. I do not take it that the agents of our

even if they do represent special interests in the United States, are hungry for another war. If they are, the American people will soon find it out and will take whatever action may be necessary to curb their activities or have them replaced." Believing that differences over the Marshall Plan did not warrant jeopardizing labor solidarity, he urged reflection and a common sense approach. "There is no question about it but that in the distribution of relief in this fight, in this war against hunger, the people who absorb the food might very well refrain from becoming a party or a part of any totalitarian form of government," he submitted. "That is reasonable. And that is to be expected. . . . If in the distribution of food those things should ensue in Europe, there is not much you and I can do about it if the people make up their minds they don't want Communism when they get plenty of food. That is true. . . . That is a fact." He concluded by reiterating that representatives from all factions had supported the foreign policy resolution and therefore "there has been no disagreement." But Murray either underestimated or did not fully comprehend the profound ideological differences between his position and that of the communists. In essence, he was asking them to give up their world view so that the CIO would have a better chance of electing a pro-labor Congress in 1948. This made no more sense to the communists than their opaque oratory made to Murray and other "non-Party outsiders."⁵²

Though the communists wisely refrained from forcing a showdown in Boston, they remained committed to their interpretation of the Zhdanov line. Beginning immediately after the convention, Eugene Dennis, John Williamson, the party's national labor secretary, and Robert Thompson, the New York state director, presided over a series of secret meetings with the "labor influentials." Stung by the CIO convention's rejection of a third party and its unofficial support of the Marshall Plan, these CP leaders nonetheless believed that if they could generate enough rank and file opposition, they might yet force Murray to reverse himself. According to Michael Quill, the Transport Workers Union president, Dennis at the first gathering on October 18, "in very blunt language," ordered his comrades to disregard everything they had agreed to in Boston and launch a no-holds-barred attack on the Marshall Plan. A discussion then ensued on how to put pressure on the unions and on Congress to defeat the European Recovery Program. The labor influentials were also to ignore the CIO's proscription of any efforts on behalf of a third party. Williamson told Hugh Bryson to press forward with his

efforts in California and assigned Ben Gold, president of the Fur and Leather Workers union, to raise \$5000 and send it to the IPP.⁵³

Though the labor leaders followed the communists' directives, they met with little success. Indeed, during the next few weeks the CP's position within the CIO deteriorated. Walter Reuther's overwhelming victory at the United Automobile Workers' convention in mid-November drastically shifted the balance of power within the labor federation against the pro-Soviet faction. Most commentators believed that with the anti-communist Reuther now in complete control of the UAW's executive board, the party's sway within the powerful 920,000-member union—and the CIO at large—would not long survive. "The Communists have lost their last chance to dominate or deeply influence an important segment of the American labor movement," wrote the political journalist Stewart Alsop. Moreover, Alsop continued, their defeat had broader political implications, "for without a solid, unassailable base in the labor movement, the Communists are reduced to comparative political impotence." Though hardly accepting Alsop's analysis, party leaders did acknowledge the significance of the setback. In the wake of the UAW convention, they abandoned even their public pretense of preserving the "center-left" coalition with Murray and shifted their focus toward forging a "united front from below" which would circumvent the CIO leadership and its opposition to their course.⁵⁴

The discussion at the next meeting of the labor influentials, apparently held on December 15, reflected this new outlook. Michael Quill later testified that Dennis, Williamson, and Thompson informed the union leaders that the CP had "decided to form a Third Party led by Henry Wallace, and that Wallace would come out in the next few weeks and announce that he was a candidate for President of the United States on the Third Party ticket." The communists, he recounted, "[were] asking all the left-wing controlled unions to start to petition and campaign now, to start the publicity, to line up endorsement for Wallace as soon as he announced himself on the radio." Quill objected that such a move might splinter the CIO, and suggested that the proposal at least be put to a referendum of the rank and file. Thompson responded that this was not a matter for membership to decide and that those in attendance were obliged to follow the orders of the party's central committee "even if it splits the CIO right down the middle." "To hell with you and your central committee!" Quill shouted, telling Thompson to relay his message to "that crackpot" Foster. "It was a refreshing moment in Party history," the anti-

Stalinist writer Dwight MacDonald later quipped. But the communists remained adamant. John Williamson subsequently approached the TWU president and said, "This is ours; we created it; get busy and support it."⁵⁵

Despite Quill's outburst, the meeting continued along the same line. Thompson declared that the unionists must go all out in their support for Wallace in order to stop the "rightward trend" in the CIO. As for Wallace himself, the question arose as to whether he was "reliable." In an article for the *Washington Post*, the veteran journalist Alfred Friendly, drawing on interviews with Quill and other eyewitnesses, reported that Dennis and Thompson acknowledged that "Wallace was not so adhesively consistent as might be desired, but that he could be held as long as the Communists surrounded him and worked on him. The answer was to the effect that 'to the extent that we encircle him, to that extent he'll stick.'" Another account relayed to Friendly, not necessary inconsistent with the first, held that the CP leadership had decided it did not matter if Wallace should break with the communists at some future date, as long as he remained a rallying point for the goals of Soviet foreign policy. No longer able to rely on the CIO as an operational base from which to attack the Marshall Plan, the communists planned to use a Wallace-led third party to fill the void. Indeed, Quill related that when he brought his doubts about the independent party to Gerhart Eisler, the former Comintern agent told him it was "in the best interests of the Soviet bloc." "[He] made it very clear to me," Quill added, "that that was the only reason why the Third Party ticket was gotten up."⁵⁶

Nonetheless, the communists realized that they could not commit to a third party until they were sure Wallace would agree to head it. As John Gates later wrote, "Had he refused to make the decision the Communists would have been left high and dry. There was no other candidate that could have made a third party even appear to be viable." Therefore, Gates explained, "Dennis saw to it that Wallace would be for it through our agents around Wallace. . . . The Communists did not merely endorse the decision of Wallace to form a third party. They were also most instrumental in influencing Wallace to make such a decision. . . . The Communist role in shaping that movement was considerable and also conspiratorial." According to Gates, the leading figure in these back room maneuvers was Calvin Benham "Beanie" Baldwin, a longtime Wallace associate and the executive vice-president of Progressive Citizens of America.⁵⁷

Baldwin, a native Virginian, had come to Washington in 1933 as an assistant to Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace. In 1940, President Roosevelt had appointed him to head the Farm Security Administration, where he proved a staunch defender of the independent farmer and a thorn in the side of big agriculture and its congressional patrons. Harried by the relentless attacks of Capitol Hill conservatives, Baldwin left government service in 1943 to join the staff of the CIO Political Action Committee, founded that year by Sidney Hillman, the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. He went on to manage the National Citizens' Political Action Committee, the CIO-PAC's middle-class analog, and was instrumental in bringing about its December 1946 merger with ICCASP to form the PCA. (Hillman, who died in July 1946, had opposed this combination, fearing it would give the communists disproportionate influence in any resulting organization.) Throughout this period, Baldwin had worked tirelessly to develop a close relationship with Wallace, and eventually became his most valued adviser. Wallace trusted Baldwin completely, even assigning him to investigate accusations of communist infiltration into his political circle. (Baldwin reported back that there was nothing to the charges.) Most of Wallace's old associates, however, believed that Baldwin had isolated their colleague from the political mainstream, pulling him much further to the left than he would likely have gone on his own. Others suspected that the Virginian was not being entirely candid with Wallace about his own political ties.⁵⁸

By late 1947, Baldwin was relentlessly pressuring Wallace to become an independent candidate for president, even at the risk of alienating PCA board members who opposed launching a third party. "At this stage," Curtis MacDougall recounted, "Beanie Baldwin was working 'tooth and nail' to get Henry Wallace to commit himself and was taking no chances on his being exposed to any influences which might delay or distract him in making up his mind. The charge that he acted in a highhanded fashion as regards the PCA was, I believe, justified." John Gates later revealed, however, that there was more to Baldwin's "highhandedness" than the Progressive Party's chronicler realized. "The statement by MacDougall that Beanie Baldwin worked tooth and nail to get Wallace to commit himself is accurate," Gates told his former comrade, Joseph Starobin. "What MacD[ougall] did not know, he added, "was that BB was a Communist and was the chief agent of Dennis and [Albert] Blumberg in influencing Wallace."⁵⁹

Still, the decision to run for president was Wallace's alone. Despite the CP's formidable (and deceitful) attempts to sway him, he at no point became a puppet subject to communist "discipline." Wallace followed his own political trajectory and, as Gates acknowledged, the party had to abide by it. By early December 1947, however, it appeared that both Wallace and the communists had concluded that a third party would best serve their respective interests.

¹ The most articulate rendering of this interpretation appears in Americans for Democratic Action Publicity Department, "Henry A. Wallace: The First Three Months," Series 3, Box 16, Folder 212, ADA Southeastern Pennsylvania Chapter Papers. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 115-20.

² Curtis D. MacDougall, *Gideon's Army* 3 vols. (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1965), 1:224-83.

³ Jacques Duclos, "On the Dissolution of the American Communist Party," *Political Affairs*, 24 (July 1945), 656-72. Almost immediately the CPUSA leadership sought out two French communists staying in Washington to obtain further clarification of the Duclos Letter, but, since the PCF had had nothing to do with the letter's preparation, "naturally," as one Soviet official later remarked, "the French Communists could give them no additional information." According to the historian Joseph Starobin, Browder realized at this point "the high stakes involved in the Duclos criticism." Joseph R. Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 271-72. See also Theodore Draper, "Memorandum of Conversation with Earl Browder," Box 4, Folder 21, Theodore Draper Research Files, and Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M. Anderson, *The Soviet World of American Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 266.

⁴ Klehr, *Soviet World*, 91-106. Other articles published in the *Bulletin* during the first half of 1945 also reveal the Soviet government's hostility toward its Western allies, sentiments not expressed in public statements. Documents recently released from the Presidential Archive in Moscow demonstrate as well that Stalin was ready to pursue a policy of confrontation with the West as early as the fall of 1945. See Ilya Gaiduk, "Stalin: Three Approaches to One Phenomenon," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Winter 1999), 124. Earl Browder later referred to the Duclos letter as "the first public declaration of the Cold War." His long-time friend Philip J. Jaffe concurred with this assessment. In a 1975 critique of revisionist diplomatic historians who characterized Soviet policy as an entirely defensive reaction to U.S. aggression, Jaffe wrote, "Since the Duclos piece was written late in 1944, before Roosevelt died, before the United States tested the atomic bomb, well before the Yalta Conference and long before both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, it could only have meant that Stalin, certain of Hitler's defeat, was already preparing a strategy that differed radically from that stated by him when he was still not absolutely certain of an Allied victory." Jaffe, *The Rise and Fall of American Communism* (New York: Horizon Press, 1975), 209. As Klehr and Haynes note, the discovery of the Duclos letter's "wholly Soviet origins" lend weight to this view. Still, there remain other possible interpretations of the letter's diplomatic significance. In a March 1975 letter to the historian Vojtech Mastny, Duclos himself suggested that the Soviets intended "his" letter to be an indirect warning to the West not to abandon the Big Three alliance prematurely—an "imaginary danger," Mastny writes, that "continued to obsess

Moscow despite compelling evidence of Western loyalty to the alliance." Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 272.

⁵ Before June 1945, the communist press had regularly referred to Browder as "our great leader." For a provocative analysis of Browder's expulsion as a typical manifestation of communist political culture, see Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party, A Critical History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 437-53. On the change in line and its effects on the Party's leadership, see Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 78-106.

⁶ Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 122-25, 286. The Foster-Dennis tensions were more than a personal rivalry. The struggle between ideological purists and political pragmatists would plague the CPUSA for most of its postwar history, with the former group generally gaining the upper hand, to the overall detriment of the Party's fortunes. Foster and Dennis carefully concealed their differences, however, and most of the Party cadre, much less the rank and file, never learned of such behind-the-scenes disagreements. The top leadership was even hesitant to discuss intraparty disputes with Moscow. See Klehr, *Soviet World*, 270.

⁷ Foster, *Problems of Organized Labor Today* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1946), 18; Howe and Coser, *The American Communist Party*, 454; Harvey Levenstein, *Communism, Anti-Communism and the CIO* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 209-11. See also Edward P. Johanningsmeier, *Forging American Communism: The Life of William Z. Foster* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 316-17.

⁸ James R. Boylan, *The New Deal Coalition and the Election of 1946* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), 79. For this shift in focus on the part of Popular Front leftists in southern California and Minnesota, see Ronald Brownstein, *The Power and the Glitter: The Hollywood-Washington Connection* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 106-07 and John Earl Haynes, *Dubious Alliance: The Making of Minnesota's DFL Party* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 130-31. Anticommunist liberalism, which would find expression in such groups as Americans for Democratic Action, crystallized in large part as a response to the growing pro-Sovietism of Popular Front organizations such as the NCPAC and ICCASP. In this sense, the communists within Popular Front groups were largely responsible for precipitating the splits that would plague postwar liberalism. See Jim Tuck, *The Liberal Civil War: Fraternity and Fratricide on the Left* (Lanham, Mo.: University Press of America, 1998), 21-102.

⁹ Dalton Trumbo to Olivia DeHavilland, June 24, 1946; Trumbo to Ernest Pascal, n.d. [June 1946]; DeHavilland to Trumbo, June 27, 1946, Box 1, "Trumbo Correspondence" (Jan. 1-Dec. 1946), Dalton Trumbo papers; *Los Angeles Examiner*, September 6, 1958, pp. 1, 6. Trumbo's original draft compared the United States to Hitler's Third Reich and accused "certain interests" of launching a "drive toward war against the Soviet Union." DeHavilland refused to deliver the speech and with the help of James Roosevelt and Ernest Pascal, treasurer of the Hollywood ICCASP, rewrote an address which denounced communism as incompatible with democracy. Trumbo reacted angrily, implying that Pascal and Roosevelt were fascist sympathizers. He then threatened legal action if they altered any more of his speeches in the future. The episode angered many of ICCASP's liberals and provoked several resignations in California. For a full account, see Stephen Vaughn, *Ronald Reagan in Hollywood: Movies and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 127-29.

¹⁰ For a useful summary of liberals' response to President Truman's foreign policy during 1945-46, see Alonzo Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 87-119. On

concealed communists within NCPAC and ICCASP (and later PCA) see Charney, *A Long Journey* (New York: Quadrangle, 1968), 175-76; Brownstein, *Power and Glitter*, 106-10; Larry Ceplair and Steven Englund, *The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community, 1930-1960* (Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1980), 236-38.

¹¹ Foster, "Leninism and Some Practical Problems of the Post-War Period," *Political Affairs* 25 (February 1946), 99-109; idem., "On Building a People's Party," *Political Affairs* 26 (February 1947), 109-21; Eugene Dennis, *What America Faces* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1946), 32; Maurice Isserman, *Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party During the Second World War* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), 246. Ironically, the CPUSA's near obsession with the imminence of a U.S.-Soviet war during this period was out of step with Soviet thinking. As evidenced in their public statements and intraparty communications during the late forties, Foster and other CP officials anticipated that a direct military conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was likely to erupt in the immediate future, making the need for an "anti-monopoly coalition" to combat the "warmongering" of the American government all the more acute. This viewpoint would manifest itself repeatedly in the often frantic speeches communist ghostwriters penned for Henry Wallace during the 1948 campaign. In contrast, Soviet ideologists, citing Lenin's theory of imperialism, did not foresee such a cataclysm. War, if and when it broke out, would occur between Great Britain and the United States—the two major "imperialist" powers currently competing for foreign markets. Stalin appeared to endorse this view in his oft-quoted address of February 9, 1946 in which he referred to the "inevitability" of war—a reference misinterpreted not only by most U.S. government officials, but also by the American communists. See Albert Resis, *Stalin, The Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies, 1988), 6-17 and William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 66-71. For official American reaction to Stalin's February 9 speech, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 299-303. Joseph Starobin notes that Eugene Dennis even cited Stalin's speech as confirmation of the CPUSA's position on the "war danger." When Foster traveled to Europe in early 1947, however, many prominent communists criticized the American Party's emphasis on the immediacy of the "war danger." In response, Foster tempered his rhetoric, only to return to his original position after the formation of the Cominform that fall. See Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 155-57, 286. For Foster's estimation of the "war danger," see Foster, "American Imperialism, Leader of World Reaction" *Political Affairs* 25 (August 1946), 686-95. Henry Wallace's curious response to Stalin's February 9th statement also misinterpreted the Soviet leader's views, but did reveal that Wallace was already attributing Cold War tensions primarily to U.S. aggression. "I read over Stalin's speech last night," Wallace wrote in his diary, "and was impressed at the vigor with which he was taking up the various challenges which we have been making all the way from the President on down." John M. Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 550.

¹² George Blake Charney, "Lessons of the Congressional By-Election in N.Y.," *Political Affairs* 25 (April 1946), 362-70; John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 240; New York *Herald-Tribune*, June 25, 1947, p. 21; Robert F. Carter, "Pressure from the Left: The American Labor Party, 1936-1954" (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1965), 250-53; David A. Shannon, *The Decline of American Communism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 115-16; Charney, *Long Jour-*

ney, 154; On the growth of communist influence within the American Labor Party after World War II, see Kenneth Waltzer, "The American Labor Party: Third Party Politics in New Deal-Cold War New York, 1936-1954" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1977).

¹³ The communists' reluctance to launch a third party that would present a specific program to mollify the "approaching crisis" reflected not only pragmatic political concerns but ideological uneasiness. "Practical policy dictated the development of a program to alleviate, offset, or delay the crisis," Joseph Starobin has observed. "Such a program, however, could not be presented in such a way to foster 'illusions' that the 'anarchy of capitalism' could be overcome or that the system could be made to work. . . . Furthermore if these measures were taken seriously as being able to affect the course of events, they might blur the distinction between the Communists and their allies—a distinction which had to be maintained at the risk of falling into 'revisionism.' Yet the strategic objective of 'curbing monopoly capitalism' demanded the help of these very allies. The desired alliance between the communists and the center-left was thus constantly in jeopardy, or at least always subject to a serious inner strain. The communists could go along with sorely needed allies only in the conviction that even mutually agreed-upon proposals were no more than illusions." Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 128. This analysis also explains the unstable nature of the liberal-Communist alliance in the Progressive Party.

¹⁴ Dennis, "Defeat the Imperialist Drive Toward Fascism and War," *Political Affairs* 25 (September 1946), 778-809. This line differed little from Dennis's June 1945 summation of the party's position: "It is necessary from now on to create the conditions and base for organizing a major third party nationally . . . [yet] it is essential that the advocates of a third party do not weaken their cooperative relationship with those anti-fascists who do not yet favor a third party." See Dennis, *America at the Crossroads: Postwar Problems and Communist Policy* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1945), 7-33.

¹⁵ Dennis, "Defeat the Imperialist Drive Toward Fascism and War," 803-05; *idem.*, "Concluding Remarks on the Plenum Discussion," *Political Affairs* 26 (January 1947), 11-13. Though Dennis did not say as much, communists would have known to conceal their Party membership and present themselves to such groups as "independent progressives." In turn, the CPers scorned as "red baiters" those liberals who called attention to their Party affiliation. This tactic worked to great effect in a political culture in which any indulgence in "red baiting" immediately marked one as a "reactionary." For evidence of communist efforts to carry out Dennis' instructions, see "The Party Builder," an internal newsletter published by the Organization and Education Department of the Washington state Communist Party. In a spring 1947 issue, the editors reported that the Party's Inter-professional club was "concentrating mainly on building the PCA organization in Pierce County." The Labor Unity club had put out PCA mobilization leaflets at a railroad shop, while the Tom Paine club was planning to "develop ways of building PCA in the precincts and thus build the Party." Copy in Box 1, Mary and E. William Hopkinson papers, University of Washington.

¹⁶ Klehr, *Soviet World*, 257-71. The authors reprint two documents found in the Soviet archives that summarize the exchange of information. One is a report from Vronsky to Paniushkin detailing his meeting with Childs and the other is a memo from Paniushkin to his superiors, Andrei Zhdanov and Alexsei Kuznetsov, offering his comments on Childs' questions. While in Moscow, Childs also asked how the CPUSA was to respond when two foreign communist parties expressed divergent views on a particular question. In hindsight, one can see that Paniushkin's reply had significance beyond the immediate issue. "We believe," he wrote, "that it is absolutely not required that the CPUSA respond to all disputes and dissension that arise from time to time in various parts of the world."

¹⁷ Jaffe, "Notes on Wallace," Box 12, Folder 13, Philip Jaffe Papers, Emory University; Jaffe, *Rise and Fall of American Communism*, 88-91; Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 287-88. The Vronsky memo indicates that Childs had asked to see a member of the Central Committee, thus giving credibility to Jaffe's account of the meeting with Lozovsky. Jaffe also claimed that Childs met with Jacques Duclos in Paris and asked him to write another "letter" that might clear up the confusion within the CPUSA. Duclos declined, allegedly adding, "Look at what you did with the last one." Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 288.

¹⁸ John Gates, "The 80th Congress and Perspectives for 1948," *Political Affairs* 26 (August 1947), 716-29; Bella V. Dodd, *School of Darkness* (New York: P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1954), 202-03; Foster, "American Imperialism and the War Danger," *Political Affairs* 26 (August 1947), 675-87. See also Gates, *The Story of an American Communist* (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1958), 114-17. Gates notes that he "presented" the report, but does not claim authorship. On August 5, *Daily People's World* columnist Adam Lapin pronounced Republican senator and potential presidential candidate Robert A. Taft as the "real threat" in 1948. *Daily People's World*, August 5, 1947, p. 6.

¹⁹ Dennis, "Concluding Remarks on the Plenum Discussion," *Political Affairs* 26 (August 1947), 688-700. The text of Dennis's September 18 speech in Madison Square Garden appears in the *Sunday Worker*, September 28, 1947. In the September issue of *Political Affairs*, Jack Stachel, the Party's long-time expert on labor issues, bluntly declared: "It can be accepted as a fact that the Communists alone, and even with their Left supporters in the labor and people's movement, will not and cannot organize a third party." Stachel, "The Third Party Movement in the 1948 Elections," *Political Affairs* 26 (September 1947), 789.

²⁰ Shannon, *Decline of American Communism*, 133-34; *PM*, May 14, 1948; *Daily Worker*, August 14, 1947, p. 6; August 16, 1947, p. 8; September 4, 1947, p. 3; September 6, 1947, p. 12; Howe and Coser, *The American Communist Party*, 464. Though the three communist union leaders later denied to Curtis MacDougall having had any conversation with Hollander concerning a third party, the latter's account seems reliable given the overall CP strategy at the time. For conflicting assessments of Hollander's credibility, see MacDougall, *Gideon's Army*, 258-59 and Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 290. Starobin makes the more compelling case that Hollander was telling the truth.

²¹ S.W. Gerson, "Electoral Coalition Problems in New York," *Political Affairs* 26 (October 1947), 897-99; *Daily Worker*, August 14, 1947, p. 6; Robert Bendiner, "Politics and People." *Nation* (September 6, 1947), 218.

²² *Proceedings of the Second Biennial Convention of the National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, CIO, May 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1947* (San Francisco: National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, 1947), 7, 125; *MCS Voice*, May 15, 1947, p. 6; May 29, 1947, p. 2; July 24, 1947, p. 6; August 21, 1947, p. 10; October 30, 1947, p. 3; *Daily People's World*, August 12, 1947, p. 1.

²³ *Daily People's World*, May 20, 1948 pp. 1, 3; C.B. Baldwin, "Report on Wallace Western Trip," June 3, 1947, Box 11, C.B. Baldwin papers, University of Iowa; Henry A. Wallace, "Report from California," *New Republic* 116 (June 9, 1947), 11-13; Merrill Raymond Moremen, "The Independent Progressive Party in California," (M.A. thesis, Stanford University, 1950), 28. In a 1950 interview with Moremen, Bryson stated that he had intended the IPP to be an "ALP-like" party and had given little thought to it being connected with a national party movement.

²⁴ William Harlan Hale, "What Makes Wallace Run?" *Harper's* 196 (March 1948), 245; James A. Wechsler, "What Makes Wallace Run?" *Progressive* 12 (February 1948), 21. Many observers expressed surprise at Kenny's plumping for

Wallace since the Californian had been noticeably cool toward him during Wallace's fight to remain on the ticket at the 1944 Democratic convention.

²⁵ Carey McWilliams, California's Third-Party Donnybrook," *Nation* April 24, 1948, 434; William R. Burke, "Report of the Fresno Conference to Launch Plans to Nominate Henry Wallace for President on the Democratic Party Ticket," Reel 58, Series 3, Number 7, ADA papers, microfilm edition; *Worker*, July 20, 1947, p. 3; *New York Times*, July 20, 1947, p. 16; *Daily People's World*, July 19, 1947, p. 1; July 21, 1947, pp. 1, 3. Burke, the ADA Executive Secretary in southern California, and two Steelworkers Union officials who attended the Fresno gathering estimated that 50 to 60 percent of the delegates were "CP people." Given their own political biases, they may have overstated the Communist presence, but other sources sympathetic to the CP acknowledge that so-called "left-wingers" played a prominent role in the conference. See McWilliams, "California's Third-Party Donnybrook," 434 and Dorothy Ray Healey and Maurice Isserman, *California Red: A Life in the American Communist Party* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 108-10.

²⁶ Carey McWilliams, "Wallace in the West," *Nation* 1 July 5, 1947, 7-8; James Loeb to Robert Clifton, July 24, 1947, Reel 57, Series 3, Number 5, ADA papers, microfilm edition; *Sacramento Bee*, July 17, 1947, p. 1; Oliver Carlson, "Soviet Politics in California" *New Leader*, June 21, 1947 5; George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972), 660, 655; MacDougall, *Gideon's Army*, 192. Support for Wallace was strongest in Los Angeles; however, his partisans failed to realize that Los Angeles progressives were hardly representative of the state's electorate. As Ellenore Hittelman, legislative director of the Hollywood branch of ICCASP, later recalled, "Here are the people in Los Angeles who are mad for Henry Wallace, and it's natural that they should be. He was made to order for Los Angeles. He was a very peculiar man." Healey and Isserman, *California Red*, 108.

²⁷ *Sacramento Bee*, July 17, 1947, p. 24; *New York Times*, July 28, 1947, p. 7; *Daily Worker*, August 26, 1947, pp. 7-8; Janet Stevenson, *The Undiminished Man: A Political Biography of Robert Walker Kenny* (Novato: Chandler & Sharp Publishers, Inc., 1980), 71-72.

²⁸ *MCS Voice*, August 7, 1948, p. 3; September 4, 1947, p. 1; *Daily People's World*, August 4, 1947, p. 1; August 23, 1947, pp. 1, 3; August 24, 1947, p. 3; Kenneth L. Call, "A Study in Group Support of the Independent Progressive Party of California, 1947-1948," (M.A. Thesis, University of Redlands), 1955, 26-33; Milla Logan to Vi Megrath, August 25, 1947, Reel 57, Series 3, Number 5, ADA papers, microfilm edition; *Labor Action*, December 22, 1947, p. 2.

²⁹ *Daily People's World*, August 25, 1947, pp. 1, 3; August 26, 1947, pp. 1, 3; Hugh Bryson, "Progressives Must Organize a Third Party Now!: An Address delivered at the California Legislative Congress, Los Angeles, California, August 23, 1947;" Moremen, "The Independent Progressive Party," 28; *Los Angeles Times*, August 25, 1947, p. 1; August 26, 1947, p. 4. A special edition of the *MCS Voice* distributed at the Los Angeles meeting presented the arguments for a third party and spelled out how such an organization would also advance the agenda of Democrats for Wallace. See *MCS Voice*, August 21, 1947.

³⁰ Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 164, 288. Kenny described the meeting to Starobin during a 1967 interview. Some accounts portray Foster as the ring leader of those communist officials most eager to launch a third party, yet in September 1947 the FBI recorded a conversation in his California hotel room during which Foster revealed his profound skepticism about the venture. He stated that the third party could only succeed if it received wholehearted support from the CIO, which he considered unlikely. "The Communist Party must not make the mistake it made twenty years ago regarding the Third Party

movement," Foster warned, ". . . or history will repeat itself and the Communist Party will be no further ahead twenty years from now." Reflecting his syndicalist background, Foster expressed skepticism at the communists' involvement in bourgeois electoral politics under any conditions. "Before we were tagging along with the Democrats, and now with Wallace," he complained. Johanningsmeier, *Forging American Communism*, 318-19.

³¹ Brownstein, *Power and Glitter*, 107.

³² Healey and Isserman, *California Red*, 103-04. See also Stephen Schwartz, *From West to East: California and the Making of the American Mind* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 394-95. Healey quotes Al Richmond, editor of the *Daily People's World*, as expressing similar sentiments regarding Sparks. Healey replaced Sparks as Los Angeles county chairman in late 1948 when the Party, expecting that it would soon be outlawed, assigned him to organize a nationwide underground apparatus. During his remarkable career in the international communist movement, Sparks operated under several pseudonyms and helped establish an autonomous industrial colony in Kuzbas, Siberia. For further biographical information, see "Finding Aid to the Nemmy Sparks Papers," at the Walter Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.

³³ Hittelman quoted in Ceplair and Englund, *The Inquisition in Hollywood*, 237 and Healey and Isserman, *California Red*, 110. Eleanor (Bogigian) Hittelman, who had been an activist in Upton Sinclair's End Poverty in California campaign, joined the Party in the mid-1930s. For the communists' "rechanneling of funds," see Jeanne Levey to Robert Bendiner, January 22, 1947, Box 13, Folder 218, Freda Kirchwey papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College. Recounting for Bendiner her observations of a HICCASP-sponsored fundraiser held in Hollywood shortly before the 1946 elections, Levey noted, "The rear end of the baby grand piano was piled high with stacks of checks and cash which looked like many thousands of dollars. A full report of the contributions was never made public nor how the monies were spent. The election was two days off and just how this late appeal could help the election of Democrats, I do not know. This is the manner in which the Communists have been working here and elsewhere."

³⁴ Art Arthur to the Editor, *New Republic*, June 12, 1946, Reel 57, Series 3, Number 5, ADA papers, microfilm edition; Minutes of HICCASP membership meeting, February 21, 1946; Minutes of HICCASP executive board meeting, May 14, 1946 and May 26, 1946, Box 2, Hollywood Democratic Committee papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin; Carey McWilliams, "The Lesson of California," *Nation*, June 22, 1946, 743-44; idem., *The Education of Carey McWilliams* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 121-22; *Los Angeles Times*, June 7, 1946, p. 1; *Time* 47 (May 27, 1946), 24. On the Patterson campaign, see also Boylan, *New Deal Coalition and Election of 1946*, 89-90; Brownstein, *Power and the Glitter*, 107-08; and Ceplair and Englund, *Inquisition in Hollywood*, 238-39. For a conflicting interpretation that makes no mention of the communists' role in the 1946 elections, see Nancy Lynn Schwartz, *The Hollywood Writers' War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 240-42. On Patterson's relationship with the CP, see Harvey Klehr, *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 271-72. Though several witnesses testified before state and federal committees that Patterson was a member of the CP, a close look at his checkered political career suggests that he was more likely an opportunist than a communist. On CP influence within the Los Angeles Democratic party, see Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 98-99.

³⁵ Boylan, *New Deal Coalition and Election of 1946*, 90; Memorandum, Earl Corwin to Alice Hunter, June 10, 1946, "Report of Primary Activities of Radio Division of HICCASP," Box 7, Hollywood Democratic Committee papers; Oliver Carlson, "Communists and CIO-PAC Beaten in California," *New Leader* 29 (June 29, 1946), 6; Art Arthur to James Loeb, December 28, 1946. Reel 57, Series 3,

Number 5, ADA papers, microfilm edition; Lloyd Ray Henderson, "Earl Warren and California Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1965), 263-70. Though "progressives" had emphasized their independence from the Democratic party organization throughout the primary campaign, in the general election, the Republicans repeatedly linked Rogers to the Patterson wing of his party, unfairly attacking him as a "Communist sympathizer." Knowland's easy win in November reinforced California Democrats' conviction that the party had to sever all ties with the pro-Soviet left if it expected to remain competitive. Gayle B. Montgomery and James W. Johnson, *One Step from the White House: The Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 60-63.

³⁶ Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 285; McWilliams, "The Lesson of California," 744. The precinct reports of the Kenny vote in the Los Angeles area did not comport well with the communists' Marxist assumptions. Among Democratic voters, the former attorney general ran well ahead of Warren in Beverly Hills and other "silk stocking" districts while Warren frequently outpolled him in middle and working class precincts. Kenny did win a decisive majority of African-American voters, however. See Carlson, "Communists and CIO-PAC Beaten in California," 6. The communists and their allies blamed Patterson's poor showing on "big business' drive against the CIO" and the failure of the Democrats to take a more militantly progressive stand on various issues. California State CIO Council Political Action Committee, *Report to the Executive Board*, July 14, 1946, pp. 8-10.

³⁷ Brownstein, *Power and Glitter*, 108. For liberal frustration within HICCASP, see Jeanne Levey to Freda Kirchwey, January 22, 1947; Levey to Robert Bendiner, January 27, 1947; Bendiner to Levey, January 30, 1947, Box 13, Folder 218, Freda Kirchwey papers. "Many of the members that belong to Hisscasp [sic] realize they have been used as a front for the communistic line," Levey told Bendiner. "I have no objection to the Communists working as an organization, but it must be in the open and not through devious underhand methods. I would be the first one to defend their right to work as a Communist group." For similar concerns expressed by a leader of the NCPAC, see Dwight J. Bradley to C.B. Baldwin, January 6, 1947, Box 23, C.B. Baldwin papers.

³⁸ Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, HICCASP, July 3, 1946; July 10, 1946; July 20, 1946; July 30, 1946; Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, HICCASP, July 23, 1946; August 6, 1946; Box 2, Hollywood Democratic Committee papers; James Roosevelt to Hannah Dorner, July 5, 1946; Roosevelt to Jo Davidson, July 9, 1946; Roosevelt to John Cromwell, July 27, 1946, Box 3, Hollywood Democratic Committee papers. For the full text of the rejected resolution, see Marjorie Allen to HICCASP Executive Council, n.d., Box 1, Hollywood Democratic Committee papers. Dunne quoted in Brownstein, *Power and Glitter*, 109. Ronald Reagan's account of the resolution dispute illustrates the liberals' frustration with communist tactics. To resolve the disagreement, Reagan, then a member of HICCASP's executive council, suggested that the resolution be put to a secret ballot of the organization's entire membership. According to Reagan, the communist screenwriter John Howard Lawson rejected this proposal, claiming that the rank and file members "lacked political sophistication." Nor was HICCASP's executive board permitted to vote on the measure. "We didn't get to the membership—we didn't even get back to the board," Reagan recalled. "It seems HICCASP had an even more exclusive intellectual elite—an executive committee—and somehow it was decided to settle the issue in this rarefied atmosphere. Olivia [DeHavilland] was our only representative on this group. She presented our resolution and dutifully phoned each one of us that she was the only 'aye' vote." Reagan with Richard G. Hubler, *Where's The Rest of Me?* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965), 165-69. Through such methods, the com-

munists successfully guided the agenda of many Popular Front organizations, despite their constituting only a small minority of the membership. See also DeHavilland's account, which corroborates Reagan's. *Los Angeles Examiner*, September 6, 1958, p. 6.

³⁹ *Daily People's World*, June 6, 1946, p. 1; *Los Angeles Times*, September 19, 1946, p. 3B; September 20, 1946, p. 6; John L. Moore, ed., *Guide to U.S. Elections*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 1204.

⁴⁰ Dennis, "Defeat the Imperialist Drive Toward Fascism and War," 798; *Daily People's World*, July 26, 1947, p. 1; August 4, 1947, p. 1; August 5, 1947, p. 6; August 6, 1947, p. 6; September 3, 1947, p. 1.

⁴¹ *New York Times*, October 6, 1947, p. 1; "Resolutions of the 9-Party Communist Conference," *Political Affairs* 26 (November 1947), 1051-56; A.A. Zhdanov, "The International Situation," *Political Affairs* 26 (December 1947), 1090-11. For an eyewitness account of the Szklarska Poreba conference which presents a significantly different picture than the official communist versions, see Eugenio Reale, "The Founding of the Cominform," in Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch eds., *The Comintern: Historical Highlights* ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 253-68. On Stalin's reasoning for establishing the Cominform, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 129-34.

⁴² Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 246, 232, 170-71; Shannon, *The Decline of American Communism*, 134-36; Charney, *A Long Journey*, 186. John Gates, too, emphasized that the formation of the Cominform, and particularly Zhdanov's emphasis on the "united front from below" had been the "strongest influence on the decision of the CP to move for a third party." John Gates to Joseph Starobin, n.d. [1971], Box 10, Philip Jaffe papers. Though it may yet come to light that Moscow did demand the formation of a communist-backed third party in the U.S. presidential election, enough circumstantial evidence can be drawn from available Soviet sources to indicate that such a specific instruction was unlikely.

⁴³ For the views of the more militant communist union leaders, see Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 159 and Charney, *Long Journey*, 165-72. For Foster's reaction to the founding of the Cominform, see Starobin, 156-57, 171, and Johanningsmeier, *Forging American Communism*, 320; Gates, *Story of an American Communist*, 116. Several former communists have observed that the most devout Party members preferred "left sectarian" policies even though they knew pursuing such a course could bring isolation and political failure. Temperamentally, they found ideological certainty and "mass action" more congenial than intellectual complexity or political negotiation. Indeed, this outlook explained why many had joined the CP rather than some other radical group. See, for example, Charney, *A Long Journey*; Dodd, *School of Darkness*; Jessica Mitford, *A Fine Old Conflict* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977); and Frank S. Meyer, *The Moulding of Communists: The Training of the Communist Cadre* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961). But see especially, Aileen S. Kraditor, "Jimmy Higgins:" *The Mental World of the American Rank-and-File Communist, 1930-1958* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), a thorough and compelling analysis of the worldview of the "typical" American communist.

⁴⁴ R. Alton Lee, *Truman and Taft-Hartley: A Question of Mandate* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), 96-105; MacDougall, *Gideon's Army*, 178-79; *New York Times*, July 21, 1947, p. 1. For the politics of Taft-Hartley and the significance of Truman's veto, see David Plotke, *Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 236-42; Robert H. Zieger, *The CIO, 1935-1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 275-76, 449, and Melvyn Dubofsky, *The*

State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 203-08. On earlier support for a labor party within the United Auto Workers, see Emil Mazey to Local Union Presidents, Region 1 and 1A, April 30, 1947, Series 5, Box 38, "Emil Mazey" Folder, Walter F. Reuther papers, Wayne State University. According to the Gallup poll, approval for the idea of a Wallace-led third party peaked at 13 percent in June 1947, just before Truman's veto of Taft-Hartley. The political journalist Michael Barone has argued that Wallace's potential support, which had been heavily concentrated among union members, declined steadily from then on as a result of the Taft-Hartley veto. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 663; Barone, *Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 215.

⁴⁵ James C. Foster, *The Union Politic: The CIO Political Action Committee* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975), 76-94; Max M. Kampelman, *The Communist Party vs. The CIO: A Study in Power Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 110; Ronald W. Schatz, "Philip Murray and the Subordination of the Industrial Unions to the United States Government," in Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, eds., *Labor Leaders in America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 249-54.

⁴⁶ Anthony Carew, *Labour Under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 70-91; LeRoy J. Lenburg, "The CIO and American Foreign Policy, 1935-1955" (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1973), 161-65; Foster, *The Union Politic*, 86-89; Kampelman, *CIO vs. The Communist Party*, 107-09; Levenstein, *Communism, Anti-Communism and the CIO*, 210-21; James Higgins, "How Long Can He Compromise?," *New Republic*, October 10, 1947, 12-15; *New York Times*, October 10, 1947, p. 17. Truman appointed several labor leaders to government positions. Most notably, James B. Carey, the CIO's Secretary-Treasurer, served on the president's Committee on Foreign Aid from which the European Recovery Program emerged. Lenburg concludes that though these men and women had minimal effect in initiating or modifying American foreign policy, they did play significant roles in administering it. In contrast, Robert Zieger has written, "the pro-Soviet unionists had no influence over or access to the decision-making process in the Soviet bloc and little influence within CPUSA circles. They could merely accommodate themselves to the party's choices." Lenburg, "The CIO and American Foreign Policy," 231-33; Zieger, *CIO*, 276.

⁴⁷ CIO, *Final Proceedings of the Ninth Constitutional Convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations*, 290-91; *CIO News*, October 20, 1947; Art Preis, *Labor's Giant Step: Twenty Years of the CIO* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1964), 339-40; Murray Kempton, *Part of Our Time: Some Monuments and Ruins of the Thirties* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1955), 75; James Higgins, "Murray and Marshall," *New Republic*, October 27, 1947, 9. Kempton credits CIO General Counsel Lee Pressman with drafting the resolution. Pressman had made his reputation by excelling at such delicate, legalistic work and would perform a similar role as Secretary of the Progressive Party's platform committee. Gabriel Almond has observed that many anti-communist CIO leaders also favored a mildly worded resolution since, at this point, they still hoped that the governments of Eastern Europe might be enticed into the Marshall Plan. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 160.

⁴⁸ John Herling, "Two Conventions: AFL and CIO," *Labor and Nation* 3 (November-December 1947), 14-16; CIO, *Proceedings*, 260-62; "Marshall and the CIO," *Newsweek* October 27, 1947, 30, 32. Michael Quill, president of the Transport Workers Union and, at that time, a leading figure in the CIO's pro-Soviet faction, later revealed that the CP's national labor secretary John Williamson had tried to organize an anti-Marshall demonstration. Quill advised him to abandon the effort. "I said," Quill recalled, "if you do this, you will upset the applecart at the

convention, and the showing the left bloc will make will be so small, it will be bad.'" CIO, "Transcript of Hearings before the Committee to Investigate Charges against the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Washington, DC, June 1950," 140 (hereafter CIO, "ILWU Hearings"), Box 110, CIO Secretary-Treasurer papers, Wayne State University. In its reporting on the convention, Hugh Bryson's *MCS Voice* made no mention of Secretary Marshall's address to the delegates. *MCS Voice*, October 30, 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 16, 1947, p. 18; Lenburg, "The CIO and American Foreign Policy," 167; CIO, *Proceedings*, 279-80.

⁵⁰ *Proceedings*, 284-85, 287.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 283; *New York Times*, October 16, 1947, p. 3; *Labor Leader*, October 31, 1947, p. 1.

⁵² *Proceedings*, 291-92.

⁵³ CIO, "ILWU Hearings," 66-67, 97-101; *Washington Post*, May 2, 1948, pp. 1, 2; Minutes of the Executive Board of the CIO, 1950, Reel 14, microfilm edition, 69-70. At this executive board meeting, Bryson claimed that he had never attended any such meeting, though most historians judge Quill's memory to be the more reliable.

⁵⁴ *New York Herald-Tribune*, November 16, 1947, p. 1; Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis*, 168-69. Reuther's use of anticommunism to facilitate his rise to power within the UAW has occasioned a lively debate among labor historians, with the result that the significance of ideology as an issue in the UAW's factional fighting has been overemphasized. Reuther's victories, as an earlier generation of commentators recognized, were based primarily on his program and the opposition's shoddy wartime record, and not on his so-called "red-baiting." For a summary of the literature and a useful corrective to the undue focus on the communist issue, see Bill Goode, *Infighting in the UAW: The 1946 Election and the Ascendance of Walter Reuther* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994). See also Howe and Coser, *The American Communist Party*, 458-59.

⁵⁵ Philip Murray, "Memorandum on Meeting of CIO Vice Presidents, Thursday, April 22," Box 44, Philip Murray papers, Catholic University; CIO, "ILWU Hearings," 143, 66-67; Dwight MacDonald, "The Wallace Campaign: An Autopsy," *Politics* 5 (Summer 1948), 180.

⁵⁶ *Washington Post*, May 2, 1948, pp. 1, 2; CIO, "ILWU Hearings," 67. Two other journalists, Edwin Lahey of the *Chicago Daily News* and Victor Reisel of the *New York Post*, also reported on these closed meetings. Their versions concur with Friendly's, whose story was the most detailed. See *Chicago Daily News*, May 17, 1948 and *New York Post*, May 7, 1948, clippings in Box 32A, Folder 7, Progressive Party papers. Though historians accept Quill's general account, the exact chronology of events during late 1947 is still not entirely clear. In his testimony at the ILWU hearings in June 1950, and contrary to the above three newspaper stories, Quill insisted that Dennis and Thompson had demanded support for Wallace in October, not December. Most secondary sources cite the December date, assuming that Quill had inadvertently juxtaposed two meetings when reconstructing events nearly three years after the fact. A memorandum in the Philip Murray papers (cited above) reveals that Quill told the CIO president as early as April 1948 that the discussion of Wallace's candidacy had occurred in October, suggesting that Quill's memory was accurate. Other evidence, however, supports the case for December. During the November convention of the California State CIO Council, Hugh Bryson spoke against a resolution calling for an outright endorsement of the IPP. Instead, with the backing of the pro-Soviet faction (which constituted the majority in the California CIO Council), the convention accepted a vague statement similar to those passed at the national CIO convention. Third party activity was acknowledged as a "significant trend" that

individual local unions might support, but that the CIO Council itself did not endorse. Merrill Raymond Moremen. "The Independent Progressive Party in California, 1948" (M.A. thesis, Stanford University, 1950), 80-84; California State CIO Council, *Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention, November 20-23, 1947*, 83-84, 89. Regardless of the exact dates, the picture to emerge is that of the top CPUSA leadership placing intense pressure on the Party's "influentials" who tried to carry out instructions without immediately jeopardizing their positions in the labor movement.

⁵⁷ John Gates to Joseph Starobin, n.d. [1971], Box 12, Folder 2, Philip Jaffe Papers.

⁵⁸ Steven Fraser, *Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 495-538, 566-72; Bert Cochran, *Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 232-35, 261-63. For Baldwin's influence on Wallace, see Louis Bean, Columbia University Oral History Program, 529-61; Nathan Robertson, "Wallace and the New Dealers," *American Mercury* 66 (May 1948), 570-71; Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940-1965* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1970), 258; On Baldwin's New Deal background, see "Calvin Berham Baldwin," *Current Biography* 4 (1943), 18-20; Studs Terkel, *Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 254-62.

⁵⁹ MacDougall, *Gideon's Army*, 236; John Gates to Joseph Starobin, n.d. [1971], Box 10, Folder 2, Philip Jaffe Papers; Author's telephone interview with Lillian Gates, September 3, 1996. Mrs. Gates stated that her husband's identification of Baldwin as a CP member was "absolutely true." Baldwin, she said, was under party discipline, but, like many concealed communists, may not have carried a party card, since discovery of his party membership would have compromised his political influence in liberal circles. Gates also confirmed that Baldwin reported to Albert Blumberg. John Abt acknowledged in his memoirs that Baldwin did have frequent meetings with Eugene Dennis to discuss the third party, but claimed that Baldwin was not a communist. John J. Abt with Michael Myerson, *Advocate and Activist: Memoirs of an American Communist Lawyer* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 165.